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The Robert Schuman Centre was set up by the High Council of the EUI in 
1993 to carry out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas of 
European integration and public policy in Europe. Research publications 
take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers and books. Most of the 
Working Papers and Policy Papers are also available on the website of the 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies: http://www.iue.it/RSC/ 
PublicationsRSC-Welcome.htm. In 1999, the Centre merged with the 
European Forum to become the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced 
Studies.
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Mediterranean Programme
The Mediterranean Programme was established at the Robert Schuman Centre 
for Advanced Studies of the European University Institute in Autumn 1998. The 
Mediterranean Programme has two long-term strategic objectives. First, to 
provide education and conduct research which combines in-depth knowledge of 
the Middle East and North Africa, of Europe, and of the relationship between 
the Middle East and North Africa and Europe. Second, to promote awareness of 
the fact that the developments of the Mediterranean area and Europe are 
inseparable. The Mediterranean Programme will provide post-doctoral and 
doctoral education and conduct high-level innovative scientific research.
The Mediterranean Programme has received generous financial support for 
Socio-Political Studies from three major institutions who have guaranteed their 
support for four years: ENI S.p.A, Ente Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze, and 
Mediocredito Centrale. The European Investment Bank, Compagnia di San 
Paolo and Monte dei Paschi di Siena have offered generous financial support for 
four years for studies in Political Economy which will be launched in Spring 
2000. In addition, a number of grants and fellowships for nationals of the 
Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries have been made available by the 
Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (for doctoral students) and the City of 
Florence (Giorgio La Pira Fellowship for post-doctoral fellows).
For further information:
Mediterranean Programme
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
European University Institute
via dei Roccettini, 9
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI)
Italy
Fax: + 39 055 4685 770 
http://www.iue.it/RSC/MED/
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Abstract
This paper highlights the impact of the exchange rate arrangement on inward 
foreign direct investment in MENA countries. We use an econometric equation 
where inward FDI in each country depends on various exchange-rate related 
determinants. We simulate the impact of a fixed peg to the euro in three MENA 
countries. The Euro-med area appears very heterogeneous, with Turkey 
unambiguously experiencing gains from pegging to the euro, while Morocco 
and Israel are in a much more mixed situation. In any case, the gain would be 
lower should many emerging countries follows the same strategy, because 
competition would increase among recipient countries. We conclude that 
stabilizing MENA currencies against the euro would exacerbate the competition 
with the CEECs.
JEL: F21, F23, F31, F33.
Keywords: exchange rate regime, foreign direct investment, monetary 
regionalism, MENA countries, EU.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
Introduction
In 1995, the Barcelona agreement gave new impetus to the Euro-mediterranean 
relations, with an ambitious program designed, among others, to reinforce the 
economic integration between the fifteen European countries and twelve 
Middle-Eastern and North-African countries (the MENA countries). The 
creation of a free trade area was planned for 2010, and a financial program was 
launched to support this ambition.
This project is in the line of the extensive regionalization of trade and 
capital flows that was experienced in recent years, and that reflects in the 
exceptional performance of gravity models in explaining trade and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) flows by geographic distance (Eaton and Tamura, 1994). In 
this framework, MENA countries belong to a Euro-Mediterranean region, 
together with the European Union and with Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CEECs). The enlargement process of the European Union and, to a 
lesser extent, the Euro-Mediterranean agreements should reinforce the regional 
links between the two emerging areas and the European Union. However the 
competition between the MENA countries and the CEECs will likely be tough.
This coming competition is a source of concern for MENA countries, 
which are not popular locations for FDI: in 1996, the stock of FDI only reached 
2.0% of GDP (or 8.3 billion dollars) in five MENA countries, whereas it reached 
5.7% of GDP (or 18 billion dollars) in seven CEECs.' This situation is a source 
of concern on both shores of the Mediterranean sea (see for instance the official 
statement of the Fourth Euro-Mediterranean Conference held in Marseille, in 
November 2000, where the low level of FDI flows to the region was 
highlighted), since it constrains growth and supply in MENA countries. 
Microeconomic inefficiencies and political uncertainty are largely responsible 
for this situation (see Petri, 1997, Bechri, 1999, or Loewendahl and Etugal- 
Loewendhal, 2000, about Turkey). However we believe that exchange-rate 
strategies are also important for attracting FDI. These strategies concern both the 
level of the real exchange rate (i.e. the competitiveness and the international 
purchasing power of the currency) and the risk associated to the nominal 
exchange rate (i. e. the volatility of the exchange rate), which both determine 
foreign investment decision, because hedging is generally not possible for such 
investments. *1
This paper was presented at the Second Mediterranean Social and Political Research 
Meeting, Florence, March 21-25, 2001, Mediterranean Programme, Robert Schuman Centre 
for Advanced Studies, European University Institute.
1 The MENA countries here include Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco and Tunisia. The CEECs 
are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia. OECD 
mirror data concern 17 capital exporting, industrialized countries.
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In theory, the impact of the real exchange rate on FDI is ambiguous, and 
depends on the motivations of foreign investors. For instance, a depreciation 
makes local assets and production costs cheaper, leading to higher inflows of 
FDI. However it can also soften protectionism and hence reduce the incentive 
for foreign firms to enter the local market through producing locally, as tariff 
jumping becomes less useful. In fact, the effect of the real exchange rate should 
depend on whether local production is to be re-exported (in this case, FDI and 
trade are complements, and hence an appreciation of the local currency reduces 
FDI inflows through lower competitiveness), or to serve the local market (FDI 
and trade are then substitutes, and an appreciation of the local currency can raise 
FDI inflows due to higher purchasing power and/or to higher trade barriers, 
which are frequent when exchange rates tend to appreciate). Unfortunately, 
available data do not disentangle the two motivations, and we have to rely on 
empirical analysis to discriminate between them. As a matter of fact, a real 
depreciation of the recipient country’s currency is generally shown to induce 
more FDI inflows, although FDI coming from the United States might behave 
differently (see Ito et alii, 1996 or Goldberg and Klein, 1997).
As to the impact of exchange rate instability, it is also theoretically 
ambiguous. A foreign firm facing large exchange rate volatility will produce in 
the local country if it intends to sell on the local market, but refrain from doing 
so if it intends to re-export2. Another ambiguity comes from the possibility of 
diversifying the risk across locations. According to Ito et al. (1996), “Countries 
whose exchange rates are negatively correlated with global returns to capital 
(such as oil-exporting countries) may actually benefit from their role as portfolio 
hedges. An increase in these countries’ exchange rates may actually raise their 
FDI inflows on diversification grounds” (p. 54). Empirical evidence concerning 
the impact of exchange rate volatility on FDI is mixed (see Cushman, 1988; 
Goldberg and Klein, 1997). But the diversification hypothesis has not been 
tested.
In this paper, we argue that the exchange rate strategy should not be 
designed in a bilateral framework. On the contrary, the presence of competing 
emerging countries within the Euro-Mediterranean region should be taken into 
account. More specifically, MENA countries could increase their attractiveness 
to FDI by making the proper trade-off between (i) low uncertainty on their 
exchange rates against the euro, («) moderate real exchange rate appreciation 
against the euro and (in) differentiation with the exchange rate strategies of the 
CEECs.
" There is no clear consensus in the literature about the link between exchange rate volatility 
and trade. According to recent works however, a higher volatility seems to lead to less trade 
(see Rose, 2000, or Fontagne and Freudenberg, 1999).
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Recent currency crises have shown the importance of stable, long term 
capital inflows as opposed to short term, unstable financing. In addition, FDI 
will also be crucial to Euro-Mediterranean partnership because it will enhance 
trade and technology transfers between the two areas. In this paper, we show 
that, should MENA countries choose to stabilize their currencies against the 
euro, FDI inflows from the euro zone would be enhanced, but the competition 
with the CEECs for attracting FDI would become tougher.
A theoretical model is presented in section 2, which links FDI in and 
emerging country to the behavior of its exchange rate, and which allows for an 
econometric estimation. Section 3 uses econometric results to analyze the 
impact of MENA countries pegging their currencies to the euro, depending on 
whether other emerging countries share the same strategy or not. Conclusions 
are drawn in section 4.
The model
Our argumentation relies on a model developed in Benassy-Quere, Fontagne and 
Lahreche-Revil (1999). This two-period model considers the choice of a 
representative, risk-adverse multinational firm facing two possible locations. 
The firm invests during the first period, and produces during the second one. Its 
products are sold only on its domestic market, at a given price (hence, we deal 
with FDI aimed at re-export3). Labor costs depend on local wages (which are 
known by the time it invests) and on the nominal exchange rate (which future 
behavior is unknown). Wages are assumed not to react to exchange rate 
variations, at least over the investor’s horizon. This assumption generates a 
foreign exchange uncertainty on profits. Of course, in reality, wages do react to 
exchange-rate variations, to an extent that depends on indexation mechanisms. 
However monthly and even quarterly data are often missing for wages and 
prices in developing countries, which prevents from computing annual series of 
profit uncertainty. This shortcoming is limited however, since wage variations 
are smoother and delayed compared to exchange rate fluctuations, triggering a 
high correlation between the nominal and the real exchange rate. In other terms, 
the uncertainty surrounding the nominal exchange rate dominates that on 
nominal wages, which justifies the simplifying assumption of wage rigidity 
when measuring profit uncertainty.
3 The re-export framework is suitable for relatively small emerging countries such as MENA 
countries. In the absence of a wide, regional market, reducing output costs becomes the main 
motivation for investing abroad (see Michalet, 1997). The re-export hypothesis is validated 
here on the basis of our econometric tests, suggesting that even FDI to large countries such as 
China or Brazil contains a significant part which aims at re-exporting the production (for an 
analysis of FDI in China, see Lemoine, 2000).
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The firm considers the exchange-rate regime as given4. We also assume 
that, although it is aggregated across multinationals, inward FDI has no impact 
in terms of real appreciation. FDI can be assimilated to a positive supply shock 
and does not carry inflation pressures in the host country. Empirically, Artus 
(1999) shows that there is little correlation between average FDI net flows (as a 
percentage of GDP) and the average growth of the real exchange-rate, for a set 
of 18 developing countries over the 1992-1996 period. In addition, there is no 
reason why bilateral exchange rates should react to bilateral FDI: since forex 
markets are typically small in emerging, host countries and large in OECD, 
investing countries, a bilateral capital inflow will typically impact on the 
exchange rate of the host against all other currencies, leaving exchange rates 
between key currencies unchanged.
The firm also faces fixed costs and transportation costs. Fixed costs are an 
incentive to produce in only one location, whereas transportation costs modify 
the labor cost advantage of each country, and are an incentive to spread 
production. Finally, capital is costly, and there is no residual value of capital 
after the production period.
The theoretical model is detailed in Box 1. Low costs in country i attract 
FDI in country i provided transportation costs and exchange-rate volatility are 
not too high. Low costs in country j  have an ambiguous impact on FDI to 
country i, depending on whether the exchange rates of i and j  against the 
investor’s currency are positively or negatively correlated. In the former case, 
the two countries are substitutes, and lower costs in country j  reduce FDI to 
country i. In the latter case, the two countries are complements, and lower costs 
in country j  increase FDI to country i. These cross effects are larger the lower 
transportation costs. This is to say that these effects should be important for 
MENA countries and CEECs which are close to the European Union.
4 Hence, we exclude a strategic game between the firm and the government: no firm is 
powerful enough to impact on the exchange-rate regime chosen by the government.
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Box 1: the equations of the model
• Profit of the multinational firm:
n  = P(Q, + Q2)-W ,(E  + Li / t, )S; -W 2(F + L J t2)S2 - r(/?, AT.S, /r, - R2K2S2 /r2) (1)
Where P is the world price of the goods produced (in the currency of the investing country); 
Qi, Li and AT, are output, labor and capital used by the firm in country t; W, and A, are nominal 
wage and capital price in country i, in local currency. Both W, and R are assumed to be given 
for the investing firm (no pressure on the local markets of labor or capital goods). The fixed 
cost F is assumed to be identical in both locations, whereas the transportation cost 1/r , is 
different5, r  is one plus the nominal interest rate (firms creating an international set of 
operations are supposed to be able to borrow at the conditions of the international market). S, 
is the nominal exchange rate of currency i against the investor’s currency in the first period 
(S; in the second period). The nominal exchange rate is hit by exogenous shocks that can be 
fully or partially neutralized by foreign exchange interventions, feedback rules and/or capital 
controls.
• Production function (complementary factors);
Q ,= Lt = K jk  i=l,2 (2)
• Profit maximization:
IMaxU = E n -  QVarn
1 e ..e ,
where <Pis the risk aversion coefficient. 
• Solution6:
a  =
i
2^(1  - P 1)
i=l,2 (4)
where p  denotes the expected correlation between S,and S2, o; is the expected standard
f  ,\y  'l S
deviation operator S and C = P -  ES,—L \- k r R :—  measures the competitiveness of
l  r. ) r.
country i.
Hence, the production in each location i depends positively on expected competitiveness and 
negatively on currency risk in location i. However it also depends on the competitiveness and 
risk associated to the alternative location j, in a sense that depends on the correlation between 
both exchange rates.
5 We assume standard iceberg transportation costs for tractability.
6 If the variance is zero (in case of a currency board, for instance), the firm maximises its 
expected profit. The first order condition then leads to P = (WtES\+rRikSx)I  r, which is a form of 
purchasing power parity.
7 We assume standard iceberg transportation costs for tractability.
8 If the variance is zero (in case of a currency board, for instance), the firm maximises its 
expected profit. The first order condition then leads to P = (W,ES\+rRlkSl) / r, which is a form of 
purchasing power parity.
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In order to validate the model, we carried out a panel estimation for a range of 
42 host, emerging countries and 17 investing, industrialized countries over the 
1984-1996 period (hence, the maximum size of the sample is 42x17x13=9,282 
observations). The following equation was estimated using OECD FDI data9:
log FDll =a0 +a, logC* + a2Vol S ‘ +a}p* xlogC* +a4 logD/ST* +asOPENi 
+ OIL.(a6 logC* +a,Vol S* + ag logD IST^+ e, +el + h‘
where log FDI1'. stands for the logarithm of the stock of FDI received by country 
i from country k at time t (in constant dollars)10 *. The competitiveness of country 
i (C, in the theoretical model) is proxied by the real exchange rate of i against 
each investing country k (a rise in C‘ signals a depreciation of country i’s 
currency). Consistently, the competitiveness of the alternative location (C;- in the 
theoretical model) is the real exchange rate of the emerging countries aggregate j  
against each investor (GDP-weighted average) C‘ .n Vol S‘ is the quarterly 
volatility of country i nominal exchange rate against k. defined as the coefficient 
of variation of the nominal exchange rate over the past three years (excluding 
/); Pi, is the correlation of ilk and other emerging currencies//: exchange rates 
(over the same period)12, which multiplies the competitiveness of alternative 
locations, consistently with the theoretical model. Finally, DIST* is a measure of 
distance between i and k.13 In a standard fashion, we add fixed effects for time 
(e,) and for investing countries (ek). The latter control for the size and other 
characteristics of the investing countries, whereas the former catch trends in the 
world economy such as deregulation. The size of the host country is partially 
captured by the openness variable (see below), although other characteristics not 
accounted for by the theoretical model such as human capital are not included in 
the estimation.
9 The estimated equation includes MENA countries, but we have checked that it is robust to 
the exclusion of MENA countries from the sample: the sign and significance of estimated 
coefficients are not modified by the change in the country sample. Hence, the estimates are 
not biased towards a particular behaviour of MENA countries.
10 The stock of FDI is preferred to the flow because it is consistent with the theoretical model, 
where the explained variable is the output in the host country which is proportional to the 
stock of capital. Note that de stock of FDI does not exhibit any trend over the period under 
study.
' 1 Since the interdependence effect between pairs of host countries cannot be tested for, we 
specify it for each host countries in relation to the aggregate of all possible locations. See 
Appendix for the calculation of the aggregate.
12 The use of past volatility and correlation can be justified by the auto-regressive pattern of 
volatility: except for institutional breaks like the settlement of a currency board, looking at 
past volatility helps to forecast future volatility.
3 We are grateful to Michael Pajot for kindly providing this measure.
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In addition to the theoretical model referred to above, we introduce an 
openness variable (OPEN,,), which is designed to control for the nature of 
foreign direct investment: if FDI aims at re-export, then it should translate into a 
large openness ratio (the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP), since entering 
the small domestic markets can hardly be the investor's motivation.14 15A dummy 
(OIL,) is also introduced to control the particular behavior of oil exporting 
countries. In these countries, FDI is mostly related to the energy sector, which is 
itself linked to the real exchange rate through a Dutch disease effect: when the 
energy sector booms, the real exchange rate tends to appreciate, but at the same 
time FDI is attracted because its profitability in this sector is increased.13 Hence, 
we should expect a positive link between real appreciation and FDI, in 
contradiction with the theoretical model, which mainly describes manufacturing 
FDI. Along the same line, the effect of exchange rate volatility is likely to be 
important in oil exporting countries, since the law of one price applies to oil 
exports: a large volatility in the nominal exchange rate means a large uncertainty 
on local operating costs and thus on profits. Lastly, transportation costs are 
expected to have little role in the location strategy since the location of primary 
commodities is determined by Nature.
The definition of the variables and the data sources are detailed in 
Appendix. Although causality tests cannot properly be implemented on annual 
data, reverse causality should not be very important between the exchange rate 
and inward FDI, as noted above. The result of the econometric estimation, ran 
on 1749 available observations, is the following:
log FD/,‘ = 0.2221ogC* -0.597Fo/ S* -0.044/)* x log Ck -0.3101og DISTk
(2.614) (-3.179) (-2.537) 1 (-6.389)
+ 0.891OPEN, + O IL ,/-0.454 log C,‘ -0 .742Vol S* + 0.352logDISTk)
(16.009) V (-3.717) (-1.947) (4.800) J
R 2 = 0.604
Student statistics are given in parentheses. All the coefficients are significant at 
the 1% level, except that on exchange rate volatility in the oil exporting 
countries, which is significant at the 5% level. Given that no microeconomic 
variable is included in the equation, a 60% explanatory power appears 
satisfactory. *•
14 The causality between trade and FDI is complex indeed (see Henry, 1994, or Fontagne and 
Pajot, 1998). However inward FDI is more likely to be associated to re-export in countries 
having a large openness ratio. In contrast, relatively closed countries (due to their policies or 
size) are more likely to attract foreign investors at penetrating the domestic market.
15 See Corden and Neary (1982) for theoretical developments on the Dutch disease.
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As expected in the case of re-export strategies, a depreciation (rise in the 
real exchange rate) of i against the investing country raises inward FDI 
(competitiveness effect), whereas an increase in the nominal exchange rate 
volatility tends to reduce FDI (volatility effect). The coefficient associated to the 
multiplicative variable p* xC* (interdependence effect thereafter) also bears the 
negative, expected sign: when the exchange rate of other emerging countries is 
positively correlated to that of country i, an improved competitiveness in other 
emerging countries reduces FDI inflows to country i (through substitution); 
conversely, in the case of a negative correlation, an improved competition in 
other emerging countries raises FDI to country i (through complementarity).
Geographic distance (which proxies transportation costs) accounts for a 
significant part of the investing behavior of industrialized countries, consistently 
with the literature on economic geography. Moreover, openness has a significant 
impact on FDI, consistently with the assumed re-export nature of FDI.
The effect of a real appreciation is opposite in oil producing countries 
compared to other emerging countries: it raises FDI inflows. This is consistent 
with the Dutch disease effect referred to above. The impact of volatility is 
reinforced compared to other emerging countries, whereas the coefficient on 
economic distance is almost zero (0.357-0.347=0.010).
Exchange rate strategies
Official and effective exchange rate regimes in MENA countries
The majority of the MENA countries of the sample have officially adopted 
managed exchange rate regimes, even though the exact arrangement differs from 
one country to the other, from a flexible managed float to pegs to currencies or 
baskets (Table l).16
16 The IMF now accounts for the observed behaviour of the authorities when assessing 
exchange-rate regimes, whereas it previously relied on official statements only. This explains 
why Egypt has moved from a managed float to a dollar peg. In 2000, Turkey adopted a more 
rigid exchange rate arrangement (a peg to a basket, with a preannounced rate of depreciation) 
in the framework of a new IMF adjustment program.
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Table 1: Official exchange rate regimes in the MENA countries of the sample
Country Official exchange rate regime
Algeria Managed float.
Egypt Managed float, considered by the IMF as a de facto peg to the dollar since 2000.
Israel Since 1991, crawling band to a basket comprising the dollar, the euro, the pound 
sterling and the yen.
Morocco Peg to a basket defined according the main trading partners of the country.
Tunisia Crawling peg.
Turkey Managed floating until mid-1998; crawling peg to a basket comprising the euro 
and the dollar since then (with a pre-announced rate of depreciation).
Source : IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, various 
issues.
In the following, we drop Algeria and Egypt which, as OPEP countries, display 
a specific behavior as far as attracting FDI is concerned. Tunisia is dropped too, 
due to the lack of data on FDI stocks. Hence, we concentrate our analysis on 
three MENA countries: Israel, Morocco and Turkey. There is now extensive 
evidence on the mismatch between de jure and de facto exchange-rate regimes 
(see Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 1999; Calvo and Reinhart, 2000; or 
Benassy-Quere and Coeure, 2000). De facto regimes can be approximated by 
the volatility of MENA currencies against the currencies claimed as anchor 
currencies (Table 2). The picture is very different across MENA countries: Israel 
obviously tends to stabilize the external value of the shequel against the USD: 
the volatility of the Israeli currency against the DM is more than twice its 
volatility against the USD. The volatility of the Moroccan dirham is more 
evenly distributed against the European currencies, the French Franc being an 
apparent anchor for this currency. Finally, the managed float under which the 
Turkish lira operated in the 1990s has led to stabilize this currency in the same 
proportion against all the currencies of the sample.
Table 2: Effective exchange rate regimes in selected MENA countries, in 1996 
Relative volatility of MENA currencies against the Deutschemark and other
• (*>currencies
Relative
volatility
DM/ French Franc DM/ Pound Sterling DM/ Japanese Yen DM/ US dollar
Israel 1.1 1.7 0.8 2.6
Morocco 1.4 1.0 0.4 0.6
Turkey 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0
Emerging(**)countries
1.0 1.1 0.9 1.1
Source: authors’ calculation, based on IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
r> Coefficient of variation of the quarterly exchange rate against the DM over coefficient of 
variation of the quarterly exchange rate against the alternative anchor.
<**) Volatility of the emerging countries aggregate against the different potential anchors 
(authors’ calculations).
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Hence,, there seems to be no particular stabilization of non-OPEP MENA 
4 currencies against the currencies of the euro (the DM and the French Franc), 
excepted maybe for Morocco. However, the trade orientation and debt 
O, denomination of these countries would justify a clearer pegging policy against 
thgpurcf (Benassy-Quere and Lahreche-Revil, 1999). This is particularly true for 
Turkey, which applies for membership of the European Union. This is also the 
case for Morocco, which also has a long-lasting policy of cooperation with the 
European Union, and is a member of the Euromed agreements. This is not as 
evident for Israel, given its long story of cooperation with the United States (and 
despite its planned membership in the Euromed agreements). However, given 
the relative proximity of Israel to the European Union, this country has a 
potential for attracting European FDI, which could be enhanced and magnified 
by a strategy of pegging to the euro.
In the rest of the paper, we try to quantify the consequences for MENA 
countries of a peg to the euro.
Scenarios of exchange rate policies in MENA countries
We use the estimates reported above in order to study what would have been the 
impact of a fixed peg to the euro in three MENA countries: Israel, Morocco and 
Turkey. Such polar exercise provides a useful benchmark to study the impact of 
a stabilization of MENA currencies against the euro.
Pegging MENA currencies against the euro should bear very different 
consequences depending on behavior of inflation in southern Mediterranean 
countries. Indeed, if their inflation rates do not converge to the average EMU 
one, MENA countries will endure a continuous worsening in terms of 
competitiveness, which is not sustainable in the long ran. In such a case, fixing 
the exchange rate allows to attract FDI through the canceling of volatility; but it 
can prevent investors to enter the market, because domestic costs are 
continuously rising.
Conversely, if the adoption of a fixed exchange rate regime induces 
MENA countries to fight successfully against inflation, so that inflation 
differentials with the EMU disappear, the peg creates a double-sided gain: FDI 
is attracted in MENA countries both through the suppression of exchange rate 
volatility and through the stability of competitive conditions.
The most likely outcome of a peg would probably lie between these extreme 
situations. Here, we run two kinds of scenarios, which match the two extreme 
hypothesis of inflation persistence versus inflation convergence. These scenarios
12
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define the span of likely situations in the euro-mediterranean area, were MENA 
countries to adopt a rigid peg against the euro.
We assume the peg lasts during the three years preceding the years under 
study. Pegging a MENA currency to the euro has three implications in our 
model, the first of which is highly dependent on the assumption made 
concerning prices:
a) Competitiveness effect:
In the first scenario, the peg does no curb inflation. The real exchange rate 
of each MENA currency against the euro17 8 therefore appreciates through 
cumulative inflation differentials, and the real exchange rate against other 
OECD currencies moves through both inflation differentials and 
variations of the euro against these currencies. This scenario refers to a 
non credible peg, which yields the worst results in terms of 
competitiveness.
However, if the peg is credible and economic agents adapt their behavior 
to the regime break, inflation differentials should narrow. As a 
benchmark, we study the polar case where the inflation differential falls to 
zero.19 In this case, there is no competitive loss from the peg between 
MENA countries and euro countries, and real exchange rates against third 
countries only move through variations in the euro exchange rate against 
these currencies.
b) Volatility effect: in both scenarios, the volatility of each MENA currency 
against the euro is reduced to zero, and its variance against other OECD 
currencies is equal to the variance of the euro against these currencies.
c) Interdependence effect: in both scenarios, the correlation between the 
exchange rate of the euro against each MENA currency and against other 
emerging currencies shrinks to zero (because one exchange rate is 
constant). Conversely, the correlation between other OECD currencies 
against each MENA currency and against other emerging currencies is 
equal to the same correlation where each MENA currency is replaced by 
the euro.
17 The euro did not exist at that time. We use the ECU as a proxy for European exchange rate 
and inflation. The drawback of this proxy is that the ECU basket included non-euro 
currencies, such as the British pound
18 For the sake of simplicity, we will speak of the euro in the rest of the paper, even if 
simulations were done using the ECU.
19 For the sake of simplicity, we ignore inflation led by a Balassa-Samuelson effect in MENA 
countries.
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MENA countries and the euro
The three alterations on exchange rate variables mentioned above are introduced 
in the econometric model to study their impact on the stock of FDI in 1995 and 
199620 (two distinct scenarios are simulated, corresponding to the hypothesis on 
price behavior). This impact is split into the three contributions of 
competitiveness, volatility and interdependence, in order to point out the trade­
off between exchange rate stability and competitiveness more explicit. We also 
look at the impact of the peg on FDI coming from the various parts of the world. 
The results are given in Tables 3 and 4.
Table 3: impact of a peg to the euro on the whole FDI stock received by MENA 
countries. (% of observed FDI, 1995-1996 average)
Country FDI
stock
(% of
GDP)
A FDI
Impact of the peg
Contribution of
Competitiveness Volatility Interde]jendence
PC NPC PC NPC PC NPC PC NPC
Israel 1.91 0.0 -3.5 3.3 -0.2 0.3 0.3 -3.6 -3.6
Morocco 3.24 -12.6 -13.9 0.6 -0.7 -0.4 -0.4 -12.8 -12.8
Turkey 1.75 108.0 84.8 -2.4 -25.7 109.6 109.6 0.9 0.9
Total 1.95 59.2 44.9 -0.4 -14.8 62.3 62.3 -2.6 -2.6
Source: authors’ calculations.
PC: assumption of price convergence between MENA and euro countries. PNC: assumption 
of no price convergence between MENA and euro countries.
The first column reports the observed stock of FDI in each host country as a 
percentage of GDP in average for 1995 and 1996. The total stock of FDI is 
rather low in the MENA countries of sample. The second column reports the 
simulated impact of a peg to the euro on the average FDI stock (1995-1996). 
The other columns split the effect into three.
As a whole, the MENA countries of the sample would have gained from a 
peg to the euro, since the global FDI stock would have increased by 45 to 60%, 
depending on the inflation scenario (remember that the initial stock is low, 
which explains this high figure); this would have raised the stock to around 3% 
of GDP (which remains far below the level observed in the CEECs for instance). 
This result mainly stems from gains arising from the reduction in volatility, 
which is positive and prominent for the three countries.
20 Since FDI is rather unstable for each country under review, the simulations are performed 
for the two last years of our sample (1995 and 1996), and the tables provide average results 
for these two years.
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When inflation rates are constrained to converge between pegged 
countries, fixing exchange rate has a positive, although very small, 
competitiveness effect on inward FDI. This is due to the fact that the ECU has 
tended to depreciate over the 1995-1996 period. Hence, Israel and Morocco 
benefit from improved competitiveness against non-euro countries. Turkey is in 
a slightly different situation, since it records a small loss. This is due to the fact 
that pegging to the euro cancels the advantage of the continuous depreciation 
that the lira experienced over the period (see Graph 1), which over-compensated 
for the inflation differential. However, the loss is small.
Graph 1. Observed Monthly nominal exchange rate of MENA countries 
against the ECU.
The competitiveness effect is negative when inflation rates are kept unchanged. 
In this case, all MENA countries lose from pegging to the euro, since they 
cannot compensate for higher domestic inflation rate by managing the nominal 
exchange rate. The impact is rather small for low inflation countries like 
Morocco and Israel; it is of course of much higher magnitude in the high- 
inflation country, Turkey.
The volatility effect is very small in Israel, where the currency was pegged 
to the dollar over the period under review: moving to a peg to the euro induces 
gains from the euro area, but losses from third countries, whose exchange rate 
tend to be more volatile against the euro than against the dollar. The same 
phenomenon occurs in Morocco, but in this case, the increase in volatility
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against third currencies slightly over-compensates for the positive impact of 
fixing the exchange rate with euro-countries.
In the case of Turkey, the volatility effect of the peg is clearly very 
positive. This is of course due to the very high instability of the Turkish lira over 
the period, which has been continuously, and increasingly, depreciating (and 
therefore volatile -  see Graph 2) against the euro since the mid-1990s.
Finally, in all the countries but Morocco, the interdependence effect is 
either negligible, as in Turkey, or negative, as in Israel, where it is however very 
small. Morocco exhibits a very different picture: there is a high loss due to the 
interdependence effect. In Morocco, during the 1992-1995 period (which is 
concerned by correlation and volatility measures, since we have a 3-years lag), 
the exchange rate tended to depreciate and then to appreciate against the dollar 
and the ECU, while the currencies of most other emerging countries tended to 
depreciate in nominal terms against the ECU. Hence, there was a negative 
correlation between the investing countries/Moroccan dirham and investing 
countries/emerging world exchange rates: when the rest of the world depreciated 
against the ECU, the dirham tended to appreciate against the ECU. Fixing all 
correlations against the euro to zero would have raised correlations, and 
therefore reduced FDI in Morocco. This loss would have caused the euro peg to 
be detrimental for Morocco.21
Hence, even if, on average, the MENA countries of our sample would 
have gained from a peg to the euro, this gain would have only come from 
Turkey which exhibited an especially high exchange-rate volatility over the 
period under review. Morocco is an unambiguous loser, mostly because it 
managed its exchange rate in such a way that it appears as a good host country 
when diversification strategies are concerned. Indeed, over the 1995-1996 
period, it attracted more FDI from countries outside the euro area than Israel 
and Turkey did.
21 Note however that the correlations of the Moroccan dirham might have been affected by the 
turmoil on European exchange markets in 1995 and 1996. As a consequence, the results could 
have been different on a different period.
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Graph 2: volatility of MENA currencies against the ECU
80
70
Israel Morocco Turkey
Source: authors’ calculations, using IMF quarterly data; volatility is computed on the three 
years preceding the one under study.
Graph 3: geographical origin of the FDI stock in MENA countries. 
In % of total FDI
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Source: OECD and authors’ calculations
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Observing the movements in FDI stocks by investor countries (Table 4) 
yields the same conclusion, that MENA countries constitute a heterogeneous 
group.
Table 4: impact of a peg to the euro on the FDI stock received by MENA countries, by 
investors’ countries
(% o f observed FDI, 1995-1996 average)
Country FDI
stock
(% of
GDP)
A FDI
Impact of the peg
Contribution of
Europe The USA Other countries
PC NPC PC NPC PC NPC PC NPC
Israel 1.91 0.0 -3.5 1.1 0.9 -0.9 -3.9 -0.2 -0.4
Morocco 3.24 -12.6 -13.9 -4.6 -5.5 -1.6 -1.7 -6.4 -6.7
T urkey 1.75 108.0 84.8 61.2 49.4 26.1 19.8 20.7 15.6
Total 1.95 59.2 44.9 34.3 27.3 14.3 9.9 10.6 7.6
Source: authors’ calculations.
PC: assumption of price convergence between MENA and euro countries. PNC: assumption 
of no price convergence between MENA and euro countries.
Ia| Austria, Germany, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands.
<b) Australia, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, lapan, New Zealand, Norway, United-Kingdom, 
Sweden, Switzerland.
On average, the gain of MENA countries would have come mostly from euro 
area countries. The gain for Turkey would have flowed mostly from the euro 
area, which is due to the fact that pegging dramatically reduces exchange rate 
volatility against the anchor currency. But since the euro is less volatile against 
other currencies than the Turkish lira is, FDI would have increased also from the 
rest of the world, with comparable magnitude.
Israel would have recorded a small (indeed, almost insignificant, around 
1% of observed FDI stock) increase in FDI stock from the euro area. The low 
level of the gain is mostly attributable to the fact that the Israeli sheqel was not 
very volatile, nor very distorted, against the euro. Suppressing exchange rate 
volatility cannot produce important gains. But Israel records a loss of FDI stock 
from the USA, due to the interdependence effect when inflation rates converge 
to the euro level, and to the joint impact of competitiveness and interdependence 
in the other case: by pegging to the euro, the sheqel becomes more similar in 
behavior to other emerging countries, and Israel loses its status of hedging 
location. This is worsened by the loss of competitiveness, which is experienced 
against euro countries, but also against the USA and the rest of industrialized 
countries. 2
22 Note however that the correlations of the Moroccan dirham might have been affected by the 
turmoil on European exchange markets in 1995 and 1996. As a consequence, the results could 
have been different on a different period.
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Finally, Morocco would have lost from all investing countries, which is 
due mostly to the interdependence effect: by pegging to the euro, Morocco 
would have been much less differentiated against other emerging countries, and 
would have therefore offered fewer diversification opportunities for investors. 
This would have translated in a reduction in the FDI stock.
MENA countries and the CEECs
Still, MENA countries are not the only emerging countries that contemplate 
anchoring their currencies to the euro. The CEECs will likely adopt such 
exchange rate arrangements in the future23, whereas Asian emerging countries 
may introduce the euro in their explicit or implicit basket pegs. In order to study 
the externality of other emerging countries choosing the same exchange rate 
regime as the MENA countries, we consider the extreme case where all 
emerging countries would choose a fixed peg against the euro. The 
competitiveness and volatility effects for MENA countries are unchanged 
compared to the case where only MENA countries adopt a peg to the euro. The 
difference comes from the interdependence effect. Namely, the correlation 
between MENA currencies and other emerging currencies exchange rates 
against all non euro currencies (including the dollar) rises to unity. This 
introduces some substitutability between the various possible locations of FDI 
coming from the United States or from other non euro investors, which is 
detrimental to all emerging countries including MENA countries (Table 5, to be 
compared to Table 3).
Table 5: impact of a general peg to the euro on the whole FDI stock received by MENA 
countries.
(% o f observed FDI, 1995-1996 average)
Country FDI
stock
(%of
GDP)
A FDI
Impact of the peg
Contribution of
Competitiveness Volatility Interde aendence
PC NPC PC NPC PC NPC PC NPC
Israel 1.91 -4.8 -8.3 3.3 -0.2 0.3 0.3 -8.4 -8.4
Morocco 3.24 -12.8 -14.1 0.6 -0.7 -0.4 -0.4 -13.0 -13.0
Turkey 1.75 106.0 82.7 -2.4 -25.7 109.6 109.6 -1.2 -1.2
Total 1.95 56.8 42.4 -0.4 -14.8 62.3 62.3 -5.1 -5.1
Source: authors’ calculations.
PC: assumption of price convergence between MENA and euro countries. PNC: assumption 
of no price convergence between MENA and euro countries.
As expected, all MENA countries would lose from increased interdependence, 
in relative or in absolute terms, depending on the individual cases. On average, 
the loss is limited, since MENA countries would lose about 2 to 3% of observed
23 When applying to EU membership, the CEECs commit to apply to euro membership later 
on.
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FDI stock, compared to the scenario where other emerging economies do not 
peg to the euro. This is due to a however significant change in the 
interdependence effect, which is doubled.
Once again, individual situations appear rather contrasted in the 
Mediterranean area. Morocco would not be penalized (this is because Morocco 
would have already lost from pegging to the euro, independently from the 
behavior of other emerging countries). A generalized peg on the euro would 
therefore be almost neutral for this country. Turkey would not be too much hit 
either, the interdependence loss being completely compensated by the positive 
impact of reduced volatility. As to Israel, it would record a systematic loss due 
to the interdependence effect, which is more than twice the loss it would incur if 
only MENA countries pegged to the euro. This loss arises from the US, and 
stems from the fact that Israel would no longer be differentiated from other 
emerging countries.
On the whole, the geographical distribution of losses and gains shows that 
the generalization of a euro-peg reduces FDI from the USA in all cases, and has 
a smaller negative effect on FDI stemming from the rest of the industrialized 
countries (Table 6, to be compared to Table 4).
Table 6: impact of a general peg to the euro on the FDI stock received by MENA 
countries, by investors’ countries
(% o f observed FDI, 1995-1996 average)
Country FDI
stock 
(% of 
GDP)
A FDI
Impact of the peg
Contribution of
Europe The USA Other countries
PC NPC PC NPC PC NPC PC NPC
Israel 1.91 -4.8 -8.3 1.1 0.9 -5.7 -8.7 -0.2 -0.4
Morocco 3.24 -12.8 -14.1 -4.6 -5.5 -2.0 -2.1 -6.3 -6.5
Turkey 1.75 106.0 82.7 61.2 49.4 24.6 18.3 20.2 15.1
Total
MENA
1.95 56.8 42.4 34.3 27.3 12.2 7.8 10.3 7.3
Source: authors’ calculations.
PC: assumption of price convergence between MENA and euro countries. PNC: assumption 
of no price convergence between MENA and euro countries.
In brief, the picture is very contrasted for MENA countries as far as attracting 
FDI through exchange rate strategies is concerned. When exchange-rate 
volatility is high, like in Turkey, the drop in volatility has a positive impact on 
inward FDI that overcomes both the competitiveness and the interdependence 
effects. However, when the regime switch consists just in changing the anchor 
currency in a context of low inflation, which is the case for Morocco and Israel, 
the picture changes: pegging to the euro produces few gains in terms of 
competitiveness or volatility, and makes MENA countries more substitutable
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with other emerging countries. In this case, the tradeoff between 
competitiveness and exchange rate instability is more explicit, and volatility 
gains can be compensated by competitiveness or interdependence losses.
Of course, the fact that all emerging countries peg to the euro is highly 
unlikely. However, the attractiveness of the euro as a monetary anchor for the 
CEECs as well as for MENA countries could raise a source of concern for some 
of the latter. This concern is all the more acute that, as the theoretical model 
shows, interdependence effects are more important for countries which are close 
to the investing area. Correlations will likely increase between the exchange 
rates of MENA countries and of CEECs against the euro, as both areas will have 
an incentive to stabilize their currencies against the euro. Hence, these countries 
will become more substitutable, and the relative competitiveness of MENA 
countries against the CEECs will become more and more important. This will be 
especially the case for Morocco and Turkey whose specializations are relatively 
close to those of the CEECs (Chevallier and Freudenberg, 1999).
Finally, following similar exchange rate strategies could exacerbate the 
competition among MENA countries. However, choosing the same external 
anchor could be a way of creating some monetary cooperation in the region, 
which could complement the development of intra-regional trade. In short, 
adopting a common anchor in the MENA region would be favorable to regional 
economic integration while raising the needs for inflation discipline and 
business-friendly reforms.
Conclusion
The choice of an exchange-rate regime is generally viewed as a trade-off 
between flexibility, i.e. the ability to smooth macroeconomic shocks, and 
credibility, i.e. the provision of an anchor to price expectations (see Edwards 
and Savastano, 1999). In MENA countries, however, the main impediment to 
sustained growth may be the lack of inward FDI. Although raising FDI would 
need extensive microeconomic reforms, we have shown in this paper that the 
exchange-rate regime may not be neutral to FDI. Namely, there is a trade-off 
between maintaining external competitiveness, which needs some flexibility in 
the nominal exchange rate, and reducing foreign exchange volatility. We have 
shown that, over the past, a peg to the euro would have raised inward FDI in 
Turkey, because a large drop in foreign exchange volatility would have resulted 
from the peg, whereas the outcome of the trade-off would have been ambiguous 
in Israel and Morocco, where foreign exchange volatility was not very large. In 
these countries, adopting an exchange-rate regime that differs from that of the
24 Bulgaria, Estonia and Bosnia have already introduced a currency board against the euro. 
For a discussion, see Masson (1999), or Benassy-Quere and Lahreche-Revil (2000).
21
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
main competitors (especially in Central and Eastern Europe) may provide 
additional inward FDI in the framework of a diversification of production 
locations. This would mean going away from pegs to the euro if the main 
competitors tend to stabilize their own currencies against the European device, 
as will likely be the case in the CEECs. Alternatively, it means that adopting a 
peg to the euro in these MENA countries would make international competition 
tougher as far as attracting FDI is concerned, and hence raise the needs for 
controlling inflation and completing business-friendly reforms.
Of course, our results should be qualified according to the precise 
exchange rate arrangement that would be adopted: here, we get a very strong 
impact of the volatility drop by imposing a strict fixed exchange rate regime, but 
this regime would not be viable if inflation differentials between MENA 
countries and the euro-zone were not to fall. We would certainly get a more 
mixed conclusion with a crawling peg regime, where volatility would be less 
reduced, but appreciation less important. Moreover, the magnitude of gains and 
losses depends probably highly on the chosen time span, while the choice of the 
peg is a long term choice. Nevertheless, we believe that there is indeed a trade­
off between exchange-rate volatility and competitiveness that should be 
weighted when choosing an exchange-rate regime, especially in MENA 
countries where the lack of inward FDI is a major impediment to sustained 
growth.
Agnes Benassy-Quere, University of Paris X (THEMA) and CEPII 
Lionel Fontagne, CEPII and TEAM.
and Amina Lahreche-Revil, University of Amiens (CRIISEA), TEAM and CEPII
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Appendix: The data and the definition of variables
1 -  Inward FDI stocks are tabulated using mirror data statistics, i.e. outward 
FDI stocks from OECD countries (source: OECD). Real FDI stocks series are 
constructed as follows, with the world consumer price index (in current dollars) 
coming form IMF, International financial statistics, line 64:
, , (  FDI stock in millions USDlog FDI = log\-----------------------------
^ World consumer price index
2 -  The competitiveness indicator C* is the real exchange rate of country i 
against country k (units of consumer goods in i needed to buy a unit of consumer 
goods in k) in level (hence, real exchange rates can be compared across 
countries and not just across time). It is taken from the CEPII-CHELEM 
database.
3 -  The volatility VolSf, is the coefficient of variation of the quarterly nominal 
exchange rate of country i against country k, during the three years preceding 
year t. Source: IMF, International financial statistics, line rf.
4 -  The coefficient of correlation between ilk and the rest of emerging 
countries//: exchange rates. The exchange rate between the emerging countries 
(/') and the investing country k is an effective, quarterly, nominal exchange rate 
of j  against k, where each emerging country exchange rate is weighted by the 
GDP of this country in the total GDP of emerging countries (source : IMF, 
International financial statistics, line rf for nominal exchange rates and line 99 
for GDPs).
5 -  The competitiveness of emerging countries against k is computed using the 
CEPII-CHELEM data-base on real exchange rates. It is a real, effective, annual 
exchange rate, where each emerging country exchange rate is weighted by the 
GDP of this country in the total GDP of emerging countries. GDP data come 
from IMF, International financial statistics, line 99.
6 -  Distance data are constructed as follows : DIST‘ is the distance between i 
and k when i and k have no common border. DIST‘ is set to one when i and k 
share a common border. Data were provided by Michaël Pajot.
7 -  Openness OPENit is the ratio of the sum of total exports and imports of 
country i, to the GDP of country i. Source: OECD, Direction of Trade.
8 -  The OIL, variable is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 for oil­
exporting countries, and zero otherwise. The countries to which this dummy is 
applied are Algeria, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, 
Libya, Mexico, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela.
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